Using a script to infiltrate within a ‘tiny’ vulnerablilty inside Qubes

[Sven]

@rangmanalpha

I’m not 100% certain, but it seems cyberattackers who were attacking me were using a script to infiltrate within a ‘tiny’ vulnerablilty inside Qubes, but I felt that qubes-usb-minimal or qubes-network-minimal service worked really well, and I subjectively felt that they would work harder to compromise my WhonixVM. I also set some restrictions on VMs, such as adding custom rules for restricting file transfer from more vulnerable system qubes VMs such as sys-net and sys-usb, and edited the name of the AppVMs and TemplateVMs with some random alphabetical strings (pofhpoqweifjmpo) making their intervention on VM via Xen vulnerability slightly more difficult… or it is just a snake oil? Anyways, I felt that the newly added security measures are very useful, I think.

Moved here from a post in the HCL category.