[qubes-users] Qubes OS 4.2.2-rc1 is available for testing

Dear Qubes Community,

We're pleased to announce that the first release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.2.2 is now available for testing. This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated [verification files](Verifying signatures | Qubes OS) are available on the [downloads](Download Qubes OS | Qubes OS) page.

## What's new in Qubes 4.2.2?

- All security updates to date
- All bug fixes to date
- Included Fedora template upgraded from Fedora 39 to 40
- Fixed [#8332: File-copy qrexec service is overly restrictive](File-copy qrexec service is overly restrictive · Issue #8332 · QubesOS/qubes-issues · GitHub) (see below)

For more information about the changes included in this version, see the [Qubes OS 4.2 release notes](Qubes OS 4.2 release notes | Qubes OS) and the [full list of issues completed since the previous stable release](Issues · QubesOS/qubes-issues · GitHub).

### Copying and moving files between qubes is less restrictive

Qubes 4.2.2 includes a fix for [#8332: File-copy qrexec service is overly restrictive](File-copy qrexec service is overly restrictive · Issue #8332 · QubesOS/qubes-issues · GitHub). As explained in the issue comments, we introduced a change in Qubes 4.2.0 that caused inter-qube file-copy/move actions to reject filenames containing, e.g., non-Latin characters and certain symbols. The rationale for this change was to mitigate the security risks associated with unusual unicode characters and invalid encoding in filenames, which some software might handle in an unsafe manner and which might cause confusion for users. Such a change represents a trade-off between security and usability.

After the change went live, we received several user reports indicating more severe usability problems than we had anticipated. Moreover, these problems were prompting users to resort to dangerous workarounds (such as packing files into an archive format prior to copying) that carry far more risk than the original risk posed by the unrestricted filenames. In addition, we realized that this was a backward-incompatible change that should not have been introduced in a minor release in the first place.

Therefore, we have decided, for the time being, to restore the original (pre-4.2) behavior by introducing a new `allow-all-names` argument for the `qubes.Filecopy` service. By default, `qvm-copy` and similar tools will use this less restrictive service (`qubes.Filecopy+allow-all-names`) whenever they detect any files that would be have been blocked by the more restrictive service (`qubes.Filecopy+`). If no such files are detected, they will use the more restrictive service.

Users who wish to opt for the more restrictive 4.2.0 and 4.2.1 behavior can do so by modifying their RPC policy rules. To switch a single rule to the more restrictive behavior, change `*` in the argument column to `+` (i.e., change "any argument" to "only empty"). To use the more restrictive behavior globally, add a "deny" rule for `qubes.Filecopy+allow-all-names` before all other relevant rules. For more information, see [RPC policies](RPC policies | Qubes OS) and [Qube configuration interface](Qube configuration interface | Qubes OS).

## When is the stable release?

That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our [release schedule](Version scheme | Qubes OS) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we're left with an RC that's good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.

## Testing Qubes 4.2.2-rc1

If you're willing to [test](Testing new releases and updates | Qubes OS) this new RC, you can help us improve the eventual stable release by [reporting any bugs you encounter](Issue tracking | Qubes OS). We encourage experienced users to join the [testing team](Joining the Testing Team). The best way to test Qubes 4.2.2-rc1 is by performing a [clean installation](Installation guide | Qubes OS) with the new ISO. We strongly recommend [making a full backup](How to back up, restore, and migrate | Qubes OS) beforehand.

As an alternative to a clean installation, there is also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.2.2 is simply Qubes 4.2 inclusive of all updates to date, this amounts to simply using a fully-updated 4.2 installation. In a sense, then, all current 4.2 users who are keeping up with updates are already testing 4.2.2-rc1, but this testing is only partial, since it does not cover things like the installation procedure.

## Reminder: new signing key for Qubes 4.2

As a reminder, we published the following special announcement in [Qubes Canary 032](Qubes Canary 032 | Qubes OS) on 2022-09-14:

We plan to create a new Release Signing Key (RSK) for Qubes OS 4.2. Normally, we have only one RSK for each major release. However, for the 4.2 release, we will be using Qubes Builder version 2, which is a complete rewrite of the Qubes Builder. Out of an abundance of caution, we would like to isolate the build processes of the current stable 4.1 release and the upcoming 4.2 release from each other at the cryptographic level in order to minimize the risk of a vulnerability in one affecting the other. We are including this notice as a canary special announcement since introducing a new RSK for a minor release is an exception to our usual RSK management policy.

As always, we encourage you to [authenticate](Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) | Qubes OS) this canary by [verifying its PGP signatures](Verifying signatures | Qubes OS). Specific instructions are also included in the [canary announcement](Qubes Canary 032 | Qubes OS).

As with all Qubes signing keys, we also encourage you to [authenticate](Verifying signatures | Qubes OS) the Qubes OS Release 4.2 Signing Key, which is available in the [Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack)](Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) | Qubes OS) as well as on the [downloads](Download Qubes OS | Qubes OS) page.

## What is a release candidate?

A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS [supported releases](Supported releases | Qubes OS) and the [version scheme](Version scheme | Qubes OS) in our documentation.

## What is a patch release?

The Qubes OS Project uses the [semantic versioning](https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as `<major>.<minor>.<patch>`. Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as "patch releases." A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.2) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. (See [supported releases](Supported releases | Qubes OS) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases.) Installing the initial Qubes 4.2.0 release and fully [updating](How to update | Qubes OS) it results in essentially the same system as installing Qubes 4.2.2. You can learn more about how Qubes release versioning works in the [version scheme](Version scheme | Qubes OS) documentation.

This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:

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