Prevent Qubes OS clearnet leaks

I do not use Whonix. I do use Tor and I2P.

The thread started with avoiding clearnet links and the underlying aim
was about hiding the use of Qubes. I’ve somewhat extended
that to “hiding use of Qubes, Tor, and Whonix.” A single request from a
qube is not enough for that. What will reveal is patterns of behavior
(personal and system) and (perhaps) links to endpoints.

System behavior - candidates could be those patterns peculiar to
Qubes/Whonix. Time connections, update checks, end point access. This is
why ( a long time ago) I suggested turning those off in clearnet. You
may want to turn them off altogether.
In some cases a determined adversary would be able to note traffic to
Qubes update mirrors. Another flag might be traffic from a Fedora host
to Debian update mirrors. In most cases there will be no magic bullet
that can be used to identify, but a pattern of behavior, which may be
identifiable whether in the clear or through Tor. Updates and templates
will carry identifiable characteristics, and will be known to the
adversary.
We have had some success in identifying Qubes and Whonix hosts through
traffic analysis. Tor through Qubes is more difficult to distinguish
from “normal” Tor, so with reasonable opsec you would be part of larger
community than that of Qubes/Whonix users.

I would say (again) that most users who are concerned about security and
privacy are far more likely to make mistakes in use than to be let
down by Qubes. For many users, the best thing to do is to use Qubes
defaults and to focus on hardening the system using existing tools, like
policy settings, and to learn how best to take advantage of the
isolation that Qubes offers.

I never presume to speak for the Qubes team. When I comment in the Forum I speak for myself.
5 Likes