I edited etc/quabes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputKeyboard so it says
sys-usb dom0 allow
$anyvm $anyvm deny
(I had deleted the second line, but then put it back. I may have mistyped it when I put it back, I didn’t back it up before the edit.)
I am also using a USB mouse that is ergonomic.
Although I have an ethernet port in my system, I have been using a USB ethernet because I thought this might reduce vulnerabilities of Intel ME. My thinking was that ME often relies on Internal components, and if it’s having to search for external devices to access things, and with Qubes, it may reduce ME as a vulnerability. (One day I’ll afford System76.) This is likely flawed reasoning.
There are different USB controllers in my system, and I know I could try to isolate them. The USB ethernet is on a different controller.
I do not understand if what I did now with giving the USB keyboard dom0 access allows someone who has hacked the sys-usb hub via the ethernet which is attached to access dom0 right away or if sys-usb is only letting the keyboard and mouse have access. This feels like really bad isolation to me, and when I read the instructions for making this only apply to 1 USB hub, I didn’t understand the instructions, even after trying to read support threads.
Am I making a mistake by doing things this way? I also think that as a Qubes user, who is sometimes downloading things from Qubes-specific IP addresses, I am at a higher risk of attack because people may think a Qubes system has more valuable information. Although the IP addresses being contacted are likely secure, these days Internet communication passes through so many large players that use DPI and other tools and I don’t trust my infrastructure, which is part of why I like Qubes.
Is it worth it to try to apply this only to the bus controller? Should I stop using the USB ethernet? Am I looking at this the right way?