Concerns about sensitive information leakage: ProcessorId

I know that qubes os tries to use compartmentalization to isolate different qubes from each other. But qubes os doesn’t seem to try to hide the information the hardware exposes to qubes.
Run the following commands in different windows qubes:

wmic cpu get ProcessorId

You can get output like this:

ProcessorId
0123456789ABCDEF

This id is the same in different windows qubes.
You can also get the reversed id in dom0:

[user@dom0 Desktop]$ sudo dmidecode
Processor Information
ID: EF CD AB 89 67 45 23 01

The worst thing is that, I also have windows installed on the same computer. I ran the command and get the same output.
My concern is whether it is possible for an attacker to associate different qubes based on this information and thus discover the user’s true identity?

EDIT:
But interestingly I can’t get it in linux qubes:

user@vault:~$ sudo dmidecode
# dmidecode 3.3
Scanning /dev/mem for entry point.
# No SMBIOS nor DMI entry point found, sorry.

On Whonix workstation:

sudo dmidecode
# dmidecode 3.3
Scanning /dev/mem for entry point.
# No SMBIOS nor DMI entry point found, sorry.

QubesOS is a security oriented OS; anonymity is not the primary focus. If you want to do things anonymously within QubesOS, use the Whonix components (gateway and workstation). These can be chosen on installation already, so it’s conveniently available without much configuration.

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Related FAQ entry: https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#what-about-privacy-in-non-whonix-qubes

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