## File format:
## service-name|*       +argument|* source          destination action  [options]

## Note that policy parsing stops at the first match.

# policy.RegisterArgument should be allowed only for specific arguments.
policy.RegisterArgument *           @anyvm          @anyvm      deny
policy.RegisterArgument *           @anyvm          dom0        deny

# WARNING: The qubes.ConnectTCP service is dangerous and allows any
# qube to access any other qube TCP port. It should be restricted
# only to restricted qubes. This is why the default policy is 'deny'

# Example of policy: qubes.ConnectTCP +22 mytcp-client @default allow target=mytcp-server
qubes.ConnectTCP        *           @anyvm          @anyvm      deny

# VM advertise its supported features
qubes.FeaturesRequest   *           @anyvm	        dom0	    allow

# Windows VM advertise installed Qubes Windows Tools
qubes.NotifyTools       *           @anyvm          dom0        allow

# File copy/move
qubes.Filecopy          *           @anyvm          @anyvm      ask

# Get current date/time
qubes.GetDate           *           @tag:anon-vm    @anyvm      deny
qubes.GetDate           *           @anyvm          @anyvm      allow target=dom0

# Get slightly randomized date/time
qubes.GetRandomizedTime *           @anyvm          dom0        allow

# Convert image to a safe format, also, allows to get an image (icon) file from a VM
qubes.GetImageRGBA      *           @anyvm          @dispvm     allow
qubes.GetImageRGBA      *           @anyvm          @anyvm      ask

# Notify about available updates
qubes.NotifyUpdates     *           @anyvm          dom0        allow

# Open a file in a VM
qubes.OpenInVM          *           @anyvm          @dispvm     allow
qubes.OpenInVM          *           @anyvm          @anyvm      ask

# Open URL in a VM
qubes.OpenURL           *           @anyvm          @dispvm     allow
qubes.OpenURL           *           @anyvm          @anyvm      ask

# Start application using its menu entry (only applications with menu entries
# are allowed, no arbitrary command). Argument is an application name (in case
# of Linux, basename of .desktop file from /usr/share/applications or similar
# location).
qubes.StartApp          *           @anyvm          @dispvm     allow
qubes.StartApp          *           @anyvm          @anyvm      ask

# HTTP proxy for downloading updates
# Upgrade all TemplateVMs through sys-whonix.
#qubes.UpdatesProxy     *    @type:TemplateVM        @default    allow target=sys-whonix
# Upgrade Whonix TemplateVMs through sys-whonix.
qubes.UpdatesProxy      *   @tag:whonix-updatevm    @default    allow target=sysWhonix
# Deny Whonix TemplateVMs using UpdatesProxy of any other VM.
qubes.UpdatesProxy      *   @tag:whonix-updatevm    @anyvm      deny
# Default rule for all TemplateVMs - direct the connection to sys-net
qubes.UpdatesProxy      *   @type:TemplateVM        @default    allow target=sysFire
qubes.UpdatesProxy      *   bwsync                  @default    allow target=sysFire
qubes.UpdatesProxy      *   @anyvm                  @anyvm      deny

# WARNING: The qubes.VMShell service is dangerous and there are really few
# cases when it could be safely used. Especially when policy set to "ask" you
# have no way to know for sure what command(s) will be called. Compromissed
# source VM can substitute the command. Allowing one VM to execute
# qubes.VMShell over the other VM allows the former to TAKE FULL CONTROL over
# the later. In most cases this is not what we want!
#
# Instead we should be using task-specific qrexec services which provide
# assurance as to what program will be responding to the (untrusted) VM
# requests.
#
# It is, however, safe, in most cases, to allow ultimate control of the
# creating AppVM over the DisposableVM it creates as part of the qrexec service
# invocation. That's why by default we have "@anyvm  @dispvm allow" rule. Note
# that it does _not_ allow any AppVM to execute qubes.VMShell service over any
# DispVM created in the system -- that would obviously be wrong. It only allows
# qubes.VMShell service access to the AppVM which creates the DispVM as part of
# this very service invocation.
#
# See e.g. this thread for some discussion:
# https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/xnAByaL_bjI/3PjYdiTDW-0J
qubes.VMShell           *           @anyvm          @dispvm     allow
qubes.VMShell           *           @anyvm          @anyvm      deny

# WARNING: qubes.VMRootShell has similar risks as qubes.VMExec
# Add "user=root" option to any ask or allow rules.
qubes.VMRootShell       *           @anyvm          @anyvm      deny

# WARNING: The qubes.VMExec service is dangerous and there are really few
# cases when it could be safely used. Contrary to qubes.VMShell, when policy is
# set to "ask", the command to be executed is visible in the confirmation
# prompt. But once allowed, the source VM have full control over the command
# standard input/output. Allowing one VM to execute qubes.VMExec over the
# other VM allows the former to TAKE FULL CONTROL over the later. In most cases
# this is not what we want!
#
# Instead we should be using task-specific qrexec services which provide
# assurance as to what program will be responding to the (untrusted) VM
# requests.
#
# It is, however, safe, in most cases, to allow ultimate control of the
# creating AppVM over the DisposableVM it creates as part of the qrexec service
# invocation. That's why by default we have "@anyvm  @dispvm allow" rule. Note
# that it does _not_ allow any AppVM to execute qubes.VMExec service over any
# DispVM created in the system -- that would obviously be wrong. It only allows
# qubes.VMExec service access to the AppVM which creates the DispVM as part of
# this very service invocation.
#
# See e.g. this thread for some discussion:
# https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/xnAByaL_bjI/3PjYdiTDW-0J
qubes.VMExec            *           @anyvm          @dispvm     allow
qubes.VMExec            *           @anyvm          @anyvm      deny

# WARNING: qubes.VMExecGUI has similar risks as qubes.VMExec
qubes.VMExecGUI         *           @anyvm          @dispvm     allow
qubes.VMExecGUI         *           @anyvm          @anyvm      deny