Split topic from flexi-chains (R/E bios&firmware hack newbie)


Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer through power lines

Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer by turning RAM into a Wi-Fi emitter

Exfiltration of data from a compromised air-gapped computer through acoustic analysis of the FAN noises

good luck


Not to add to the potential rabbit hole here, but this also maybe a good entry point to what @ppc is referring to:

Not sure luck will help you there.

I suggest you read the paper: x86 considered harmful (I’ve lost the link).

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it just a joke

it here

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Sorry, didn’t mean to come across as rude.

Did my twtr show up*?

*Edit @deeplow are socials not allowed on the forum?

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thanks for the link , it contains many useful information about anonymity.
Also thanks for the x86 paper.

From the advanced targeting techniques, exfiltration of air-gapped computer,
may happen through:

  • light variation in backlit keyboard, HD LEDs, display brightness,
  • FAN noises, ultrasonic soundwaves, vibrations,
  • electromagnetic interferences, electromagnetic emissions, magnetic waves
  • GSM frequencies,
  • turning RAM into wifi emitter,
  • power lines

from the link above, these advanced targeting techniques, requires malware, to infect the air-gapped laptop first, before then it can perform exfiltration. but, my old laptop was never connected to the internet, because its Linux version, since its installation, is not compatible, with the wifi card, also I had already unplugged the wifi card. therefore, since there is no way, for malware to infect, then it looks like, the techniques being used, are not any of these advanced techniques.

also from the x86 paper, and the link above, i think other gap possibilities, that maybe being used are, bluetooth and ultrasonic soundwaves,

hmm, but i wonder, why the link above, doesn’t mention, whether intel ME or AMD PSP have independent internet access, or maybe i missed something, anyone have link or paper, that mention, whether x86 architecture has independent internet access ?

because the independent internet access, described here, doesn’t mention whether it requires wifi card or not.

i found it in techlore marix

good job, you make your laptop almost offline

it could be any kind of wireless and wired connectivity (no one know)

i read here.
There are 4 ways to breach air-gapped computer:
electromagnetic, acoustic, thermal, optical transmission

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it still quite theoretical and very non-practical

See also: Frequently asked questions (FAQ) | Qubes OS

A small note: air-gapped computer is not stand-alone computer

Qubes project obviously wants to point out inconvenience of physically separate computers, but really, if you are truly serious in security, physically separate computer will always stay as a relevant option.

Yes, it will be a bit cumbersome and inconvenient, but at least there’s no worry about hypervisor security, never.

When it comes to file transfers, I agree it is a bit questionable to use removable USB devices, but options exist. One could use for example kermit/qmodem over null modem cable. G-Kermit is so simple implementation it can be audited by normal human being. Complexity of that kind of communication system is not even comparable to complexity of the Qubes virtual separation.

For me Qubes is not ultimate security solution, but it is convenient way to use for example laptop on the road. But I don’t even try to cram in one single computer all my computing needs!



You can add this

Lan cable making radio frequencies, an air gapped secure network can be listened.

a very good research but air-gapped system doesn’t connect to any device that have internet, since that so air-gapped computer don’t have lan cable go outside

There can be air gapped (with a data diode for example) internal secure networks


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Qubes project obviously wants to point out inconvenience of physically separate computers, but really, if you are truly serious in security, physically separate computer will always stay as a relevant option.

yes, that’s correct, thanks @turkja

i know that as an OS, maybe it is out of scope for Qubes,
to cover the security of hardware / firmware level,
but i think, we also cannot close eyes to the reality,
that the threat targeting hardware / firmware level, does exist.

sometimes i feel insulted,
because the hardware / firmware level attack,
can simply bypass several layer of OS security,
and then directly read the vault VM.

also actually, based on my experience,
maybe there is no guarantee,
that only high-profile person will be attacked, via hardware / firmware gap,
because i am also, just a random low-profile person,
not os_m_ bin l_d_n, not or p_bl_ esc_b_r, not or edward snowden,
but I’m also being targeted, for any random un-clear reason.


this not os security, it hypervisor security

osama bin laden ?

pablo escobar ? (you might leaked some info here)

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why do you type those name out ?
i thought those name are sensitive, although they are not around anymore.

idk that

I would suspect that simply using Qubes OS may already be sensitive, since it has very few users who are interested in unusually strong security. So it doesn’t matter what you write here on forums.