Proof of Concept.
Qubes-Sleepkeeper protects you from physical attack when the attacker force you to enter the password of your Qubes after it wakeup from sleep or from password guessing after wakeup. The attacker have very limited time to do so or Qubes will shutdown automaticaly.
Interesting but threat model unclear. If the attacker can force you to
enter one password after suspend, why would he not force you to enter
LUKS and user password 5 minutes later? Please explain. Rather an evil
maid "attempt detection" (not protection) by "laptop is down instead of
sleeping"? I think it really could help as additional data protection in
case of normal, criminal theft...
interesting but threat model unclear. If the attacker can force you to
enter one password after suspend, why would he not force you to enter
LUKS and user password 5 minutes later?
There are a lot of more attack vectors when system is booted and only protected by xscreensaver.
The attacker can use some hardware backdoors, xscreensaver bugs/backdoors/kill it to receive access: dump your memory on hardware level, receive access to memory from vulnerable hardware, guess screensaver password etc.
If the system will automatically shutdown then there is only one attack vector: LUKS password
пятница, 30 октября 2020 г. в 07:54:14 UTC, haa...@web.de:
if some someone want physical protection from torture. It is possible to improve this concept and destroy LUKS disk header before shutdown. Then it will be useless to torture.
interesting but threat model unclear. If the attacker can force you to
enter one password after suspend, why would he not force you to enter
LUKS and user password 5 minutes later?There are a lot of more attack vectors when system is booted and only
protected by xscreensaver.
The attacker can use some hardware backdoors, xscreensaver
bugs/backdoors/kill it to receive access: dump your memory on hardware
level, receive access to memory from vulnerable hardware, guess screensaver
password etc.If the system will automatically shutdown then there is only one attack
vector: LUKS password
There's no disagreement that shut down is more secure than suspended, but the devil is in the details. How exactly is it supposed to work?
1. Attacker forces you to wake up computer (e.g., open laptop lid).
2. Attacker forces you to enter password.
3. You enter incorrect password?
4. Attacker tells you to enter correct password this time?
5. Qubes shuts down because it's been too long?
Why not just have an alternate passphrase that, when entered, shuts down the PC (or, as you suggest, wipes the LUKS header)? Why a timer?
Perhaps the alternate passphrase, when entered, also sends out an SOS message?
Why not just have an alternate passphrase that, when entered, shuts down
the PC (or, as you suggest, wipes the LUKS header)? Why a timer?
At least because it is not constant that attacker will ask you to do something and will not begin dump your memory immediately.