We have published Qubes Canary 029. The text of this canary is reproduced below.
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---===[ Qubes Canary 029 ]===--- Statements ----------- The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file  state the following: 1. The date of issue of this canary is December 13, 2021. 2. There have been 74 Qubes security bulletins published so far. 3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce backdoors). 5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first fourteen days of March 2022. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special announcements ---------------------- Many PGP keys in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) that are used elsewhere in the project (such as the Qubes builder), including the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), were signed or self-signed using the SHA-1 hash function. Unlike some other uses of SHA-1, its use in our PGP signatures does not pose a noteworthy security risk unless an adversary is capable of performing a successful preimage attack (not merely a collision attack). Since there are presently no known feasible attacks against the preimage resistance of full SHA-1, our use of SHA-1 in PGP signatures does not currently pose a relevant security risk. Nonetheless, as a preemptive defense-in-depth enhancement and to support deprecation of SHA-1 in tooling, we have decided to re-(self-)sign many of these keys using SHA-256 or SHA-512.  In addition, the qubes-secpack contains several expired code signing keys, old release keys, and keys belonging to individuals who are no longer active Qubes developers. We have decided to move these keys into new "retired" subdirectories. (We've decided to move them rather than delete them, since some users may wish to use them to authenticate old signatures. Note that this is merely a matter of convenience, since even deleted files always remain in the Git repository's history and can always be retrieved that way.) To be clear, none of the actions described here constitute a response to any security incident. To our knowledge, the keys in the qubes-secpack are not and have never been at risk. No key fingerprints have changed as a result of these actions. We consider this updating and cleanup of the keys to be more of a "housekeeping" task. Disclaimers and notes ---------------------- We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads. This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to produce false declarations. The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance. This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of the statements made here. Proof of freshness ------------------- Mon, 13 Dec 2021 01:15:23 +0000 Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss) Resurrection of the SP: The Unexpected Rise of Germany's New Chancellor, Olaf Scholz BioNTech Founder Şahin on the Omicron Variant: “It Will Make Scientific Sense To Offer Booster after Three Months” City of Warriors: Resistance Across the Border to the Myanmar Military Junta Deadly Intrigue: The Story of the Destruction of an Aid Organization The One-Man State: Viktor Orbán and the Fall of Democracy in Hungary Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml) Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It. ‘Our Boat Was Surrounded by Dead Bodies’: Witnessing a Migrant Tragedy Israeli Leader Travels to U.A.E., Showcasing Deepening Ties New Caledonia Says ‘Non’ to Independence Diplomats Warn Russia of ‘Massive Consequences’ if It Invades Ukraine Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml) Kentucky tornadoes: Death toll likely to pass 100, governor says Kentucky tornadoes: 100 year-old-church destroyed in seconds Vladimir Putin: I moonlighted as a taxi driver in the 1990s Black Axe: Leaked documents shine spotlight on secretive Nigerian gang Alibaba fires woman who claimed sexual assault Source: Blockchain.info 00000000000000000001b7c62afe91ab5ddb7ce534f4868fc71e4c9e4797f7b2 Footnotes ----------  This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags.   Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/  https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/6470 -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
This is a companion discussion topic for the original entry at https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2021/12/13/canary-029/