2 of those zero days were reported in the news finally by January, I went public on Twitter about some of it in December
He was using 2 of the 3 or 4 zero days that were patched in January and February (fyi)
I mean you don’t have to believe me lol, I am here for solutions not to fight against belittling of victim blaming and disregarding of first hand witnesses lol
If this is your situation, this person will have a much harder time getting into Qubes. That’s a much easier hack then getting past multiple Qubes.
Use different operating systems for sys-net and sys-firewall. It means he’d have to hack two things.
He probably used social engineering to get into your AT&T Firewall. He could call up, say he’s you and get that password. The MacOS firewall probably has exploits listed online.
For a good hacker, your system before would have been easy to hack. You should be okay now. It’s going to be so much harder for anyone to hack you. You’re right: Qubes is better than Tails. Just keep posting if you have questions. People here respond fast.
I guess you feel like belitting ADT, he recently hacked my ADT when it wasn’t even on my home network but on ADT’s own private cellular. I guess they must be brainless newbies as well to be remotely hacked huh? (sarcasm)
Yes, I am very thankful to QubesOS Forum people helping me through this. Yall have been a God send, and I am nearly done with this phase of building back out my network to get back online thanks to many here who helped me through a few situations I almost felt like giving up on lol
Image Description:
Photo of a software based glitch obliterated ADT panel screen (again not hardware, the screen is fine — the software displays lines now as the entire root file system was left corrupted)
This laptop hasn’t yet been online yet so I truly do not yet know, and I am setting up other templates and qubes first and saving these for last so I have no idea they look like Whonix though
Well, didn’t read each message but I saw you got the link to the glossary, that’s a good start. Using the good vocab is not that important but the underlying concepts are essentials.
You say you don’t have time to learn the Qubes basics but from what I see, it’s your best option, it’s far better than trying to customize the defaults like users and passwords.
It’s a bit off-topic but your post about template and appvm is a good example: it’s far more efficient for a begginer to learn the concepts of Qubes OS and apply them than to try to harden random things. You put a browser, a mail client and an office tool in the same qube but maybe using a qube for each one, even with the default firefox, is far more secure.
Yes, because each will have its own dedicated email alias and/or email account
I am not even sure I will have my mom use the mail client, as she might do best with the web portal to such the only issue is some of the web based email providers may not suffice in stopping Beacon attacks that tag which may fingerprint the qube appVM itself if it remains persistent — then again that is why 2 out of the 3 are going to be disposable
I don’t think my mom will be happy about the clipboard, which is also why I figured to have dedicated alias emails associated with her activity per each qube included
The idea is banking will be banking stuff, but it will not be her 2FA (I do have a different qube appVM for just 2FA)
Top separate qube appVM is a different color, green, while the 3 bellow are a charcoal dark gray.
0 QUBES 3D square image =
1 side says the OS minimum requirements,
“16G RAM, 250G hard disk”
The top side describes its appVM config as,
“Persistent Storage [with a thick red question mark as I don’t know the RAM or disk allocation yet I will give it]”
The final 3rd facing front side has install and functional descriptors as,
“[bullet point] 2FA / MFA” then goes on to list the software installed,
“[package box icon] [redacted] app 2FA
[package box icon] [redacted] OTP
[package box icon] Authy”
Bellow are the charcoal gray qubed box shapes:
3 qubes representing the appVMs from the Templated base iso image of an OS.
1st QUBED 3D square image =
1 side says the OS minimum requirements,
“4G RAM, 15G hard disk”
The top side describes its appVM config as,
“Disposable 8G RAM, 5G hard disk”
The final 3rd facing front side has install and functional descriptors as,
“[bullet point] Banking” then goes on to list the software installed,
“[package box icon] Libre Wolf
[package box icon] Thunderbird
[package box icon] Libre Office”
2nd QUBED 3D square image =
1 side says the OS minimum requirements,
“4G RAM, 15G hard disk”
The top side describes its appVM config as,
“Disposable 8G RAM, 5G hard disk”
The final 3rd facing front side has install and functional descriptors as,
“[bullet point] Finance” then goes on to list the software installed,
“[package box icon] Libre Wolf
[package box icon] Thunderbird
[package box icon] Libre Office”
3rd (last) QUBED 3D square image =
1 side says the OS minimum requirements,
“4G RAM, 15G hard disk”
The top side describes its appVM config as,
“[in bold red letters] Persistent [end of bold red letters] 8G RAM, 5G hard disk”
The final 3rd facing front side has install and functional descriptors as,
“[bullet point] IRS / Taxes” then goes on to list the software installed,
“[package box icon] Libre Wolf
[package box icon] Thunderbird
[package box icon] Libre Office”
• NOTE:
The mention of the OS for the Template was redacted in all 3 qube appVM image depictions
Just make sure that if you are installing Libre Wolf, you are installing it in the template itself. You could use the AppImage inside the AppVm without modifying the template also if you prefer that. What’s hard about that is that for Librewolf they want you to import the signing key and the repo and to do that you will need to download it in a non-template and copy it to the template VM and then move it to the right directory. You could just use the AppImage in the mean time. I would make a post to ask for advice on how to do that properly. I’ve posted a lot but I’m not that good with Qubes or linux and am not explaining this well.
Sometimes you can do everything right and still get hacked and Qubes takes a long time to set up. I would urge you to backup your qubes and keep them in offline storage. You can restore Qubes really easily and if you system gets corrupted, it’s not that hard to reinstall Qubes and restore the backups of the Qubes.
Had no idea … I haven’t installed these yet as I have just been planning them out
Is there a guide on here that has those steps?
Eventually it will likely come to that
Yup! Got that covered, I have a drive dedicated for image backups and all that
Good point, may have not thought this all through… might have the web emails here instead then hmmm. The issue is not all the web emails protect against Beacon attacks such as tagging hidden little tracking pixels into image sent through email. Okay well I have to think this over again, thanks for the reminder
If you load webemail using whonix, those beacon would get different addresses. You just need to make sure your email provider will not block tor exit nodes.
You can use Thunderbird in a non-disposable AppVM as well.