i like qubes strategy of security its great but it uses so much resources. i know that its because your running 5 computers with the resources of 1 but is there a way to be more resourceful? (16gb ram 2 hours of battery life)
for example an alternetive that also does security by isolation with less power? or have some vms use less power? or some other solution im not seeing?
And mirage firewall / minimal templates. I was going to say if you wanted to stay within the qubes ecosystem but actually is mirage part of the qubes ecosystem and/or is Liteqube part of it. The lines sometimes get a bit blurry?
does it work on the latest qubes verison? it says “Please note I currently do not have time to maintain Liteqube, it is not updated to support Qubes 4.2.”
right now no vms work getting the error message "failed to start logical volume “vm-sys-usb-volatile” already exist in volume group “qubes dom0” (vm sys usb volatile is just an example)
Regarding communication between clients, mirage-firewall forbids it (except in the case of openBSD where the uplink is a client and thus communication between clients and openBSD is expected) and only forward flows between a client and the firewall’s netvm.
And if you want more isolation, you can even run one mirage firewall per AppVM, the memory footprint is small enough compared to sys-firewall.
(noob) is it safe to put stuff from the interent into dom0? (home network is unsafe but i cant do anything about it just on device i can put protections)
It is considered to be a bad idea to copy files into dom0, but sometimes it is necessary. For example, dom0 update process downloads the repositories and packages in the update VM (usually sys-firewall or sys-whonix), then moves them to dom0. Then, dom0 checks the GPG signatures of the files to ensure their integrity, before parsing/installing them.
So in this process, you are already trusting:
The inter-qube file copy system
The correctness of the GPG verify code
The integrity of the Qubes OS release key
The good faith of the Qubes OS team
I imagine installing Liteqube would be similar, substituting:
The correctness of the GPG key import code
The identity of the Liteqube signing key (and whatever browser/mechanism you use to identify its fingerprint, and all that comes with that)
The integrity of the Liteqube signing key
The good faith of the Liteqube developers
Ultimately, it comes down to your threat model. Hope this helps!