Help with a dom0 script for crontab to automatically install latest ublock in Tor browser

Everytime i update whonix template, I lose ublock origin in Tor Browser. I know whonix does not include ublock, Tails does.

If I am installing ublock, would I fit in with other Tor users with ublock or would I stick out as a Qubes user who is using Tor and ublock?

Is there a dom0 script that could check whonix-workstation somehow to see if ublock is installed to the latest version and, if not, update it to the latest version?

Could this be a security concern somehow?

1 Like

YES, you would stick out. Depending on where you browse to, of course. In my personal and opinionated stance, I keep the Tor Browser as close to the “anonymous default” as possible, but your use case may be different.

On the other question, about the dom0 script - I’m 99.99% sure that it does not exist. Can be easily written tho - but what’s the point?

2 Likes

The latter, specifically a Whonix user using Tor Browser with uBlock Origin, so use Tails OS for the former.

1 Like

Frankly, is it really that bad? Does everyone use creep.js in javascript these days? the fingerprint api would catch this as unique? the fingerprint api is really bad at identifying someone who modifies 1 or 2 things in a unique way. blending in does not work as well as faking it, from my understanding, because when you fake it they see you as new each time. do companies use creeps.js in the wild?

I just don’t see how this would work. Since Tor is sandbox, and javascript identifies an OS as linux or iOS etc, is it sensitive enough that it will know immediately Qubes versus Tails?

You’re probably write because I know how smart you are, extremely, and I’m still learning stuff. But it’s surprising to me.

1 Like

For people who don’t have an extremely high threat model, it would be a great convenience to not have to check and update with each new whonix download. These days, because cloudflare doesn’t always block Tor, Tor can be used for regular browsing, and ads are annoying and sometimes a privacy threat.

2 Likes

It depends on your threat model. See also:

2 Likes

Right, it’s a good point. For a high enough threat model, it would be a bad idea. Someone could also have 2 whonix workstations, one with ublock. For anything just casual, I don’t care that much. I am terrified of surveillance capitalism in our very unpredictable world, in which 1 year’s “this person could like a new toaster with AI features” turns into the next year’s “this person may have views opposed to the regime and needs further monitoring or worse.” Having written that, I don’t know if surveillance capitalism will go “yep, this one is the Qubes user with the ublock! Get 'em!” I don’t know if it could do that unless I was being directly targeted, and hopefully I’m not.

(It would be ironic if I were arrested tomorrow morning after posting this, and never heard from again.)

1 Like

Sure, although I would not consider using Tor Browser in Qubes-Whonix a casual use case.

3 Likes

I often use Tor for casual browsing to help strengthen the network. As much normal noise as possible always helps.

1 Like

Then it is important that your browser fingerprint is identical to other Tor Browser users. Any non-standard configuration can lead to your deanonymization and reduce the anonymity set of other Tor Browser users.

3 Likes

You should consider running the script in the whonix-workstation itself rather than dom0. You can automatically run a script on boot by adding commands to /rw/config/rc.local (this file should already exist with some comments explaining its use).

Basically, dom0 is extremely sensitive and doing as little as possible inside of it is a best practice.

1 Like

even if this is true, i would like to run this with any whonix template, not needing to import it each time

however, everyone has told me this idea is stupid and makes me stand out and i should actually use tails for this

1 Like

will using Tails in a standalone HVM connected to sys-firewall os sys-vpn lead to standing out?

1 Like

What sort of advantage(s) are you attempting to gain out of these unusual configurations?

I prefer to browse without ads. It’s partly about avoiding surveillance capitalism while javascript is on. I do not entirely believe Tor Browser will protect me from javascript based attacks on privacy. creeps.js shows a lot of information, even for something like Tor Browser which protects privacy. I believe that blocking ad tech javascript protects me against surveillance capitalism.

I also find ads annoying. Often without ublock I get on every page “Why aren’t you logging in with google or facebook? Don’t you want to link your google and facebook accounts to our stupid website so we can make money from surveilance capitalism” pop-ups and they annoy me.

I also prefer using anything in Qubes because of my fear of rootkits. I can use a non-Qubes distro and use rkhunter regularly, but sometimes rkhunter will say it finds something suspicious and I don’t know how to deal with it. Qubes is harder, but also easier. With Qubes I am significantly less worried about rootkit level malware in dom0, despite thinking my chipset is likely backdoored in ways of which I’m not yet aware.

1 Like

It is up to you and what you are willing to risk. However, I would like to remind you that deanonymization is very easy to achieve through user error:

If I were you, I would dedicate a Live USB with Tails OS for dealing with ad-ridden clearnet web browsing, while using Qubes-Whonix strictly for anonymity purposes.