Good News - Testing Tor Browser DispVMs Against New fingerprint.js Browser Fingerprinting

[unman]

Re-reading the original post by @qubes-kernel-5.8 I was struck by this:

Bonus Test: I fired up another Tor Browser (AnonDist) from the whonix-ws-15-dvm template and visited the demo website leaving almost no time gap between each instance. I first disabled HTML canvassing, and got different identifiers in each instance of the Browser (really, OS). I then gave each browser a “New Identity” and enabled HTML canvassing, and I still got different identifiers in each browser instance.

Conclusions: it seems that fingerprint.js has a difficult time tracking Tor Browsers which are part of a Whonix VM. I would really love to have some people test this on other Tor Browsers running in Qubes, other GNU/Linux distros, as well as Mac and Windows.

This doesn’t look like “Good News” for Whonix in Qubes.

But, as I said, you should consider why you are concerned about
fingerprinting.