like I said adding extra steps. Linus did a whole thing on a little micro PC that was called the most secure computer in the world and they handled it by hard wiring things in if memory serves. I am basically john D public. I am neither that rich nor that militant that I really need to worry about these things. I am, like many positioning myself for the next level or bad outcomes though. An it always pays to be prepared. I look forward to seeing what Qubes comes up with in the next iteration.
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I think this post already answered the OP’s question entirely. As for an outlook to the future, considering that most setups with nice keyboards and mouses carry firmware reflashing risks (unless you only attach them to clean sys-usbs and also exempt physical access from your threat model), I think a Heads software for input devices would be nice-to-have.
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Well, someone could build a keyboard that has hardware attestation and allow attestation over USB, then move the key to qubes and only allow such keyboards that are attested to connect, otherwise PS/2
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Not all USB devices can be reprogrammed either.
PS/2 device cannot pretend it’s something else.
PS/2 device has limited functionality,
PS/2 device has much, much smaller attack surface.
A malicious PS/2 keyboard can type nonsense, or refuse to type, or do other mischief through e.g. key combinations without pretending it is something else. Mice can misbehave too. All that can result in data damage/loss.
On the hardware side, a device can have a powerful capacitor that can create a spark and burn your port (or more) at a random time.
PS/2 can be bought with a safe firmware
Once you are sure it’s safe, it will be safe forever while in your possession only.That’s why it is considered as a safe option.
It is considered safER, not “safe forever”. Neither the PS/2, nor the USB protocol are authenticated, which has security implications. See also:
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Nothing in my answer to the OP’s question denies that.
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